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ABSTRACT
Festinger and Maccoby (1964) while studying the effects
of distraction upon attitude change concluded that counter-
arguing is the mediator of distraction effects, while Haaland
and Vankatesan (1968) concluded that comprehension is the
major mediator. Possibly, then, counterargument production
is only elicited under a limited set of conditions. Brock's
(1967) research indicated that counterargument production
increases as the discrepancy between the subject's own position
and that advocated by the communication increases . Thus, it
was hypothesized that counterarguing mediates the effects of
distraction upon attitude change only when the discreoancy is
sufficient to evoke counterarguing. To test this hypothesis
,
the following study was conducted.
The present study experimentally manipulated both visual
distraction and discrepancy size. Neither of the independent
variables was found to have had a s ignif ican t impact on the
attitude scores . However , distracted subj ects did comprehend
less, as well as counterargue less. Weak support for Brock's
finding that counterarguing increases with discrepancy was
also obtained. The implications of these dependent measure
responses are discussed as mediators of the effects of
distraction upon attitude change.
INTRODUCTION
In an early formulation of the effects of distraction upon
attitude change, Festinger and Maccoby (1964) hypothesized
that distraction interferes with an individual's ability to
counterargue the content of a persuasive communication.
Furthermore, they hypothesized, reduced counterargument
production mediates attitude change. Since then, studies
which have attempted to test this hypothesis have shown
mixed results. The purpose of this study is to introduce
discrepancy size as an additional variable which may clear up
some of the disagreement over both results and proposed
mediators of attitude change.
A part of the confusion over experimental results may be
traced to the types of distraction which have been used. One
such distraction involves the rating of the personality of
the communicator. (Freedman and Sears, 1965; Baron and Miller,
1968, 1969; Miller and Baron, 1968) In the basic paradigm,
the subject is asked to attend either to the personality of
the speaker (distraction) or to the content of the communica-
tion (no distraction). The present analysis ~^es not consider
these studies to be an adequate test of the original Festinger
and Maccoby (1964) hypothesis since as Miller and Baron (1968)
have attempted to demonstrate, the personality-rating dis-
traction probably increases the salience of the speaker
credibility cues. A distraction of this type leads to
increased attitude change only when the credibility of the
speaker is high. Therefore, Miller and Baron hypothesize that
2credibility, and not counterarguing, is the mediator of
attitude change in the personality-rating distraction studios.
Nevertheless, studies which have used an irrelevant
distraction have also shown mixed results. In a series of
three studies, Festinger and Maccoby (1964) had fraternity
and non-fraternity men listen to a communicator argue strongly
against campus fraternities. Distracted subjects viewed a
humorous film upon which was superimposed the anti-fraternity
communication while non-distracted subjects viewed a film of
the communicator presenting his opinions. In the first two
studies, the authors failed to find any differences in attitude
change between distracted and non-distracted subjects or
between fraternity and non-fraternity men. They explained
their results by noting that neither of the schools where the
studies were conducted had particularly strong fraternity
systems. The third study, conducted at a school with a strong
fraternity system, did show that distracted fraternity men
changed their attitudes concerning fraternities toward that
advocated by the message more than non-distracted fraternity
men. In attempting to demonstrate that counterarguing is the
mediator of attitude change, Festinger and Maccoby hypothesized
that if one is unable to counterargue a communication, there
should be a positive correlation between resistance to influence
and rejection of the speaker. Moreover, the correlations
should be higher for distracted subjects than for non-distracted
subjects assuming distraction interferes with one's ability
to counterargue a communication. This hypothesis was confirmed
for distracted and non-distracted men.
In a study by Haaland and Vankatesan (1908), distraction
was found to reduce attitude change, a finding contrary to
those of the Pestinger and Maccoby (1964) study. Subjects in
the Haaland and Vankatesan study listened to either pro or con
arguments concerning lowering the voting age to 18. Two
types of distraction (visual or behavioral) were varied in a
2X2 factorial design. A humorous film constituted the
visual distraction while non-distracted subjects viewed a
communicator presenting his speech as in the Pestinger and
Maccoby (1964) study. In addition, subjects in the behavioral
distraction condition filled out questionnaires while viewing
the presentation. The results indicated lh.it distraction,
either visual or behavioral, results in less, attitude- change
than no distraction, findings which clearly contradict the
Festinger and Maccoby (1964) results. Haaland and Vankatesan
also measured recall of communication content. They round
that non-distracted subjects comprehended the message better
than d i s. t rar t ed sub j ect .
Gardner (196G), studying persuasive market inc.] appeals.,
had subjects rate live I irst run movie: -, on a desirability
scale. A communication advocating the second most desired
movie was prepared, subjects woi o eithej not distiaeted oi
distracted by (a) having subjects guide a single slot car
rapidly around a track, or (b) having subjects guide two
slot cars, simultaneously around a track. While his results
indicated no si gn.i f.i ran 1 attitude change el I eel s , he did show
that recall of message content decreased as degree of dis-
traction increased.
Not only is there inconsistency in experimental results
but there is also disagreement regarding the mediators of the
observed effects of distraction on attitude change. It should
be remembered that Festinger and Maccoby (1964) presented
indirect evidence that distraction interferes with counter-
argument production. By noting that a positive relationship
between source rejection and resistance to influence implies
reduced counterargument production, Festinger and Maccoby (1964)
hypothesized a reduction in counterargument production as the
mediator of attitude change in distraction studies. However,
Haaland and Vankatesan (1968) favored a learning theory inter-
pretation. They argued that the subject must comprehend the
content of the message in order to learn the new attitude.
Distraction, by reducing comprehension, interferes with the
learning process. Thus, there should be less attitude change
in distraction conditions. Their results are consistent with
this interpretation. Gardner's (1966) results also yielded
reduced message comprehension for distracted subjects. However,
due to the methodological weaknesses of this study and the
non-significance of the attitude change results, interpretation
of recall measures in light of the comprehension mediator
argument is extremely tenuous.
vSince the distraction studies do not provide direct
evidence that either comprehension or counterarguing mediate
the distraction effects on attitude change, it is appropriate
5to examine the general attitude change literature in order to
determine the status of the comprehension mediator and the
counterargument mediator. In his review of the comprehension
mediator literature, Greenwald (1968) points out that learning
an argument is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for persuasion. In addition, Greenwald notes that empirical
support for the comprehension mediator is generally weak.
Counterargument production has not been widely studied
though numerous investigators have assumed that an individual
evokes, subvocally, arguments which attempt to refute arguments
presented by the communicator. Due to the covert nature of
the phenomenon it is difficult to obtain direct evidence of
counterarguing. For example, counterarguing may be an aspect
of McGuire's (1964) "inoculations" against attitude change.
McGuire found that a refutational defense is more effective
than a supportive defense in inducing resistance to attitude
change. Inoculation involves presenting a weak attack on a
cultural truism while providing counterarguments to refute the
attack. According to McGuire, these refutational arguments
"inoculate" the subject against a much stronger attack later and,
thus, increase an individual's resistance to persuasion. It
would appear reasonable to assume that these "inoculation"
provide the material from which counterarguments are constructed.
Therefore, McGuire's research program on resistance to
persuasion indicates indirect support for the position that
counterarguing mediates resistance to attitude change.
The warning literature also provides indirect support
6for the counterargument mediator approach. Freedman and Sears
(1965) informed subjects of the topic of a counteratti tudinal
communication either ten minutes or two minutes before the
presentation of the speech. In addition, distraction was
manipulated by instructing some subjects to attend to the
content of the communication (no distraction) while others
were instructed to attend to the personality of the communicator
(distraction). While not obtaining any effects of distraction
on attitude change, the authors did find that the ten minute
forewarning made subjects more resistant to attitude change
than the subjects who received no warning. It might be
argued that forewarning a subject as to the content of the
message allows him time to marshal counterarguments to refute
the communicator's arguments. Although Freedman and Sears
neither provided nor measured counterarguments they did allow
the subject time to develop his own counterarguments.
Janis and Terwilliger (1962), in studying the effects of
various fear appeals on attitude change, developed a device
termed the "auditory feedback suppressor", which allowed a
subject to speak without hearing himself. It was hoped that
this device would make overt any covert thoughts or ideas
concerning the communication. Subjects heard either a high
or low fear arousing communication regarding smoking and
cancer. Janis and Terwilliger found that low threat was
more effective in changing attitudes than high even though
this finding is tempered by its low level of significance
(p < .10). However, the authors found that there were more
7communication rejection statements in the high threat condition
than in the low threat condition. If these rejection state-
ments may be termed counterarguments, then this study also
provides some evidence that counterarguing mediates resistance
to attitude change.
Having demonstrated indirect support for the counterarguing
mediator position, it becomes relevant to ask what determines
counterargument production. Perhaps counterarguing functioned
as a mediator of attitude change in the Festinger and Maccoby
(1964) study and yet not in other studies because counter-
arguing is a salient response only under a set of limited
conditions. In investigating these limited conditions, Brock
(1967) hypothesized that as the discrepancy between the
subject's position on a given issue and that advocated by
the persuasive communication increases, the amount of counter-
argument production increases. Brock told subjects that they
would be reading a message advocating a tuition increase at
their university. Discrepancy was varied by proposing dif-
ferent amounts of increase. Before reading the actual message,
subjects were asked to list "thoughts and ideas : concerning
the tuition increase. These thoughts and ideas were subsequently
scored for counterargument production. His results clearly
indicated that counterargument production increases directly
with discrepancy.
If counterarguing increases as discrepancy increases,
then distraction, by interfering with counterargument production,
is likely to lead to reduced resistance to attitude change only
8when discrepancy is moderate to high. If the discrepancy is
insufficient to evoke much counterarguing
, then distraction
should have little effect on attitude change through the
counterargument mediator. It should be remembered that in
the Festinger and Maccoby (1964) study, fraternity and non-
fraternity men were distracted while listening to a strongly
worded anti-fraternity communication. If, in fact, discrepancy
is important, distraction should lead to increased attitude
change for fraternity men and no change for non-fraternity
men since the message was clearly discrepant for the former
group and probably not very discrepant for the latter group.
Inspection of the Festinger and Maccoby results indicate that
fraternity men who were distracted did change their attitudes
more than non-distracted fraternity men, and that there were
no differences in attitude change for non-fraternity men.
The issue employed in the Gardner (1966) research was
only mildly discrepant since the message advocated the second
most desirable movie from a list of five. While Gardner did
not find any effect of distraction on attitude change, he did
find that distracted subjects recalled less oi the content
of the message than did non-distracted subjects. These results
appear to indicate that when discrepancy is low, one attends
more to the distraction and thus does not comprehend the message
Haaland and Vankatesan (1968) had subjects listen to
either pro or con messages concerning an 18 year old voting
age. Subjects were divided into the pro or con message groups
on the basis of an issue pretest. Since all subjects who
responded on the con side of the mid-point of a seven point
scale were placed in the pro message group and subjects on
the pro side were placed in the con group, the message was
highly discrepant for only those subjects with highly polarized
attitudes. Therefore, it is felt that on the average the
degree of discrepancy between a subject's initial position
and that advocated by the communication is only mild, or
perhaps moderate. Recalling Brock's (1967) findings on
discrepancy and counterargument production, it should be
noted that a mild discrepancy only evokes minimal counter-
arguing. If reduced counterarguing mediates the effect of
distraction on attitude change and mild discrepancy only
evokes minimal counterarguing, it is probable that distraction
does not affect attitude change through the counterarguing
mediator at mild discrepancy levels. Yet the Haaland and
Vankatesan results indicated that distraction reduced attitude
change. They also found that distraction interfered with
message comprehension. This pattern of findings can be
explained if one assumes that with a mildly discrepant message
subjects attend more the distraction than to the message,
a tendency which reduces comprehension and thus attitude change
In conclusion, previous research supports the hypothesis
that the amount of discrepancy determines whether or not
counterarguments are produced, and, therefore, whether or not
distraction reduces resistance to attitude change by reducing
counterargument production. If discrepancy is sufficient to
evoke counterarguments (moderate to high), and distraction
10
interferes with counterargument production, then reduced
counterarguing should lead to reduced resistance to persuasion.
If the discrepancy is mild, counterarguments are not evoked
to any great extent and therefore are unable to affect attitude
change. In the mild discrepancy condition, if the distraction
is sufficiently interesting, the subject may attend more to
the distraction than to the communication. Increased attention
to the distraction may result in reduced message comprehension.
The previous two sentences arc logical if one assumes that a
mildly discrepant communication is neither as interesting nor
as attention arousing as a highly discrepant communication. If
the reduced attention assumption is correct, the mild discrepancy
conditions should show reduced message comprehension.
The present study will investigate these predictions by
systematically varying discrepancy and by including measures
of attitude change, counterarguing, and message comprehension.
METHOD
su bj ects
Subjects (N a 133) were students at the University of
Massachusetts, approximately half of which were fulfilling an
experimental participation requirement in introductory psychology
Other subjects recruited from the dormitories participated
voluntarily. Subjects were randomly assigned to the experi-
mental conditions described below so that each condition
contained nineteen subjects. For convenience, subjects were
run in small groups varying in size from 1 to 7.
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Design
The design was a 2 X 3 factorial with two distraction
conditions (present or absent) and three discrepancy levels
(low, moderate, or high) as the independent variables. Since
subjects were not pretested, an additional group of nineteen
subjects served as controls. The control group simply filled
out a series of attitude scales to obtain a base line attitude
from which change could be measured.
Man inula t ions
Distraction
. Distraction, as in previous research (Festinger
and Maccoby, 1964; Haaland and Vankatesan, 1968), consisted
of a humorous film ( Overs and Outs ) upon which was superimposed
a persuasive communication. Non-distracted subjects viewed
a film of the communicator presenting his speech. All films
were taped on ^ inch Scotch Video Tape and presented on an 18
inch television monitor connected to a Sony AV-3200 Video
Tape Recorder.
Discrepancy . Results of an issue pretest conducted with a
different group of subjects indicated that students were
initially opposed to increasing the amount of ' ime faculty
members should be required to spend conducting research and
reducing the amount of time faculty members spend teaching.
Therefore, since this topic is clearly counteratti tudinal , a
ten minute communication was developed advocating increased
research time for faculty members. Discrepancy was varied
by manipulating the percentage of time that the communication
advocated faculty should spend in the laboratory as opposed
12
to the classroom. The communication stated that presently
faculty are required to spend 35 percent of their time conducting
research and 65 percent of their time teaching. A series of
consistent and logical arguments were then presented to the
effect that the research percentage should be increased. It
was felt that the cogency of these arguments would prevent
any outright rejection of the communication. At the end of
the communication specific recommendations concerning the
research-teaching issue were made. In the low discrepancy
condition, it was recommended that 45 percent of a faculty
member's time should be spent doing research and 55 percent
of his time should be spent teaching. In the moderate dis-
crepancy condition, the advocated split was 60 percent for
research and 40 percent for teaching. In the high discrepancy
condition, the communicator argued for increasing research
time to 75 percent and reducing teaching time to 25 percent.
Procedure
Subjects in small groups were seated in front of a tele-
vision set. The experimenter introduced himself and then
explained that he was conducting an evaluation of a proposed
Educational Television series. Subjects were given the
following instructions.
You will shortly be viewing a pilot program for a
projected Educational Television series concerning
the quality of academic life. Since the sponsors
would like some type of evaluation of the program
before it is publicly presented, the Psychology
Department has volunteered to conduct an evaluation.
So, I would like you to carefully watch the program
and then fill out a questionnaire at its conclusion.
This particular program concerns faculty time spent
13
on teaching and research. The speaker is Dr. AndrewSherwood, Assistant Professor of Psychology at UCLA.
Subjects were also told that the communicator would be reading
his talk and thus there were some errors in pronunciation as
well as pauses. In addition subjects were warned that they
may see something unusual since ETV was studying different
types of presentation.
At this point the television was turned on and the subjects
viewed a program fulfilling the requirements of one of the six
experimental groups mentioned above. At the completion of the
program, subjects were handed a booklet containing the dependent
measures described more fully below. After they had completed
all the scales in the booklet, subjects were fully debriefed
as to the manipulations and purposes of the experiment and
dismissed. Control group subjects were not given the above
instructions but merely told that they were to complete a
series of questions concerning the quality of academic life.
As with the others, control subjects were debriefed as to the
purposes and manipulations of the experiment.
Dependent Moo
s
ur es
Attitud e. Attitude toward the communication was determined by
a single attitude item. Subjects indicated their feelings
by checking any position along a seven point response scale.
The end points of the scale were labeled either "completely
agree" or "completely disagree". Specifically, the item asked
the subjects if they felt that faculty members should spend
more time doing research and less time teaching.
14
Comprehension
.
As a check on whether or not subjects compre-
hended the message, subjects were asked to list as many of
the arguments presented in the speech as they could remember.
In addition, six multiple choice type items were included to
check the comprehension of specific facts in the communication.
Counterargument Production
. Subjects were asked to respond
with either a "yes'' or "no" to a guestion asking them if they
had any "thoughts, ideas, or reactions to the communication
while listening to it." If a subject answered "yes", he was
asked to estimate the percentage of his reactions which were
relevant to the communication. In addition, he was asked
to list these relevant thoughts and ideas which had occurred
to him while listening to the persuasive communication. A
lined page in the booklet was provided for these reactions
with the word "idea" to the left of each line. In one analysis
these ideas were scored as counterarguments according to the
criteria described by Brock (1967). To be scored as a Brock
counterargument, the idea must have been a declarative state-
ment specifically against increasing faculty research time
which mentions an unoesirable consequence of such an action.
Simple statements of opposition, statements in favor of
the communication, and alternative proposals were not
counted as Brock counterarguments. If two or more Brock
counterarguments were similar, they were counted as one single
counterargument
.
These "ideas" were also scored for message and source
rejection counterarguments. To qualify as a message rejection
15
counterargument the declarative statement must have expressed
some doubt as to the veracity of either the total communication
or a specific argument contained within the communication.
Moreover, the sentence must not have indicated an undesirable
consequence of adopting the communication recommendation.
Doubt could be expressed through either outright rejection
(e.g., "I don't believe ") or by expressing reservations
(e.g., "I doubt that "). To be scored as a source rejection
counterargument the sentence must contain some type of source
derogation. While these two classifications do not involve
specifying an undesirable consequence of adopting the
recommendation, they do provide a means of coping with a
counteratti tudinal communication and are thus types of counter-
arguments.
Other Measures
. In addition to the preceding, measures of
source rejection, message rejection, recall of message
recommendation, and the degree to which the distraction was
perceived as distracting were obtained. Also, a measure
designed to tap the reinforcement value of the humorous film
presentation was incJ ^ed. These measures were included to
give an additional check on the effects of the various
manipulations
.
Finally, subjects were asked to describe the purposes of
the study in order to determine if there was any awareness of
the experimental hypotheses.
RESULTS
A series of analyses of variance was calculated to
16
determine the effectiveness of the independent variable
manipulations. A measure of the degree to which the presenta- I
tion was found to be distracting yielded a highly significant
main effect of distraction (F = 117.07, df = 1/108, p .001).
This main effect indicated that viewing a humorous film while
listening to a communication v;as much more distracting than
simply viewing a communicator present a message. In addition,
an estimate of how much time each subject spent thinking
about the message while it was being presented yielded a strong
main effect of distraction (F = 26.43, df = 1/108, p <C .001)
with distraction inhibiting thought about the communication.
Thus, both measures are indicative of a strong distraction
manipulation. Measures asking subjects to state the advocated
percentages of time to be spent on teaching and research for the
messages they heard resulted in significant main effects of
discrepancy for both the teaching recommendation IF_ - 387.50,
df = 2/108, p < .001) and the research recommendation (F = 341.45,
df = 2/108, p ^ .001). While the teaching recommendation
measure did not yield any other effects, the research recom-
mendation measure did result in a significant interaction
(F_ = 3.51, dr_ = 2/108, p ^ .05) between distraction and dis-
crepancy. Inspection of the cell means indicated that dis-
tracted subjects inflated the research recommendation manipu-
lation at mild discrepancies (X = 48.16), recalled the recom-
mendation almost perfectly at moderate discrepancy, and
overrecalled it at high discrepancy (X = 72.89). No dis-
traction subjects underrecalled the research recommendation
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manipulation at low discrepancy (X = 44.74) and specified it
almost perfectly at moderate and high discrepancy levels.
Since deviations from the manipulated discrepancy levels are
slight, the manipulation was still highly significant for
both levels of distraction.
The attitude data (Table 1) did not yield significant main
effects of either distraction or discrepancy. Moreover, there
was no interaction. However, a Dunnett's test demonstrated
that each experimental group differed from the control group at
Insert Table 1 about here
at least the .01 level on the attitude measure which attests to
the persuasive impact of the message. A comprehension measure
requesting a list of the specific arguments used in the com-
munication yielded a significant effect of distraction (F = 8.46
df = 1/108, p ^ .01) as did scores from a series of multiple
choice comprehension questions (F = 6.12, df = 1/108, o< .05).
Both measures indicated that the distracted subjects were less
able to comprehend the message. Summing the two comprehension
measures also yielded a highly significant m. Ln effect of dis-
traction (F = 11.57, df = 1/108, p 4^.005) confirming the pre-
vious findings. Table 2 presents the combined comprehension
score means for the experimental groups.
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 3 presents the data for the three types of counter
rguments as well as the mean total counterarguments for each
18
experimental condition. Since the data for each of the three
types of counterarguments (Brock, message rejection, and
source rejection) were nearly dichotomous with many subjects
Insert Table 3 about here
making only one counterargument while others failed to counter-
argue, the F statistic was inappropriate. Therefore, a X 2 for
multiple classification designs (Sutcliffe, 1957) using a yes-
no classification pooling all subjects who counter argued and
all subjects who did not counterargue was computed for each
type of counterargument. Analysis of the counterargument data
scored according to criteria established by Brock (1967)
indicated weak effects of both distraction (X 2 = 2.89, of = 1,
p <C.10) and discrepancy (X 2 = 5.70, df = 2, p < . 10 ) in the
expected directions and no interaction. That is to say, fewer-
subjects coun terargued in the distraction condition and the
frequency of subjects who did counterargue increased as dis-
2
crepancy size increased. The X analysis for source rejection
counterarguments yielded a significant main effect of distraction
(X " = 5.59, _df = 1, % .01) with more subjects in the no dis-
2traction condition rejecting the source. A X analysis for
message rejection counterarguments resulted in no significant
effects. Inspection of the data indicated that summing all
counterarguments yielded a distribution of total counterarguments
which did not seriously deviate from normality. Therefore, an
analysis of variance was computed for these data and resulted
in a significant main effect of distraction (F = 7.34, df_ = 1/108,
19
P < .01) with distracted subjects counterarguing less.
When the source rejection items were summed and an analysis
of variance calculated, a significant interaction between dis-
traction and discrepancy (F = 4.94, df = 2/108, p < .01) resulted
Table 4 presents the mean source rejection scores for all
Insert Table 4 about here
experimental conditions. Tests of the simple effects of dis-
traction at levels of discrepancy indicated that the only sig-
nificant effect of distraction occurred at the high discrepancy
level (F = 7.66, df = 2/108, p < .001), with X = 7.26 for no
distraction, high discrepancy and X = 9.63 for distraction, high
discrepancy. Similarly, message rejection items were summed
before an analysis of variance was computed. While message
rejection scores did not result in any significant effects, the
pattern of message rejection means did parallel the pattern
obtained for source rejection means. Finally, an analysis of
variance calculated for a measure designed to tap the reinforcement
value of distraction yielded a main effect of distraction
(F = 6.15, df = 1/108, p ^.05). This final analysis of
variance indicated that a humorous film distraction was found
to be aversive rather than reinforcing.
A series of correlations between attitude change and
responses that are potential mediators of the effect of dis-
traction on attitude change was examined. Combined comprehension,
total counterarguing, source rejection, and reinforcement
value of distraction were selected as potential mediators
20
since all exhibited significant effects of distraction in
the analyses of variance. Table 5 presents the correlations
between attitude scores and these potential mediators for both
distraction conditions as well as collapsed over all subjects.
The reported correlations are pooled over discrepancy levels.
Inspection of Table 5 indicates that the correlations between
Insert Table 5 about' here
attitude scores and combined comprehension are all non-sig-
nificant. Thus, there is no consistent relationship between
these two measures in this study. The highly significant cor-
relations between attitude scores and total counterargument
production indicates that the more one is able to counterargue
the communication, the less he accepts it. The correlations
between attitude scores and sour :e rejection are weak although
the correlation collapsed over all subjects is significant due
to an increase in the df . The latter correlation indicates that
the more one rejects the source, the less likely he is to accept
the communication. All correlations between attitude scores
and the reinforcement value of distraction are non-significant
indicating no clear relationship between these two measures.
discussiol;
Festinger and Haccoby (1964) hypothesized that distraction,
by interfering with counterargument production, leads to
increased attitude change. Haaland and Vankatesan (1968),
however, found a decrease in attitude change for distracted
subjects and concluded that distraction, by reducing message
21
comprehension, leads to reduced attitude change. The present
investigation takes the point of view that these two studies
might be compatible if counterargument production is elicited
under a limited set of conditions. Recalling Brock's (1967)
findings that counterargument production increases as the
discrepancy between the subject's own position and that
advocated by the persuasive communication increases, it was
decided that discrepancy could be the variable which could
resolve the conflicting experimental results. Thus, the
present study was conducted. It was hypothesized that dis-
traction would yield increased attitude change in those
discrepancy conditions (moderate and high) in which counter-
arguing would be strongly evoked. In the low discrepancy
condition where coun terarguing would not be evoked to any
extent, distraction should lead to reduced attitude change.
Unfortunately, the attitude measure in this study did not
yield any significant main effects or an interaction. An
explanation of the non-significance of this measure will be
proposed later in this section. However, comprehension measures
did indicate that di ' ^acted subjects were less able to
comprehend the message. A measure of total counterarguing
also resulted in a main effect of distraction with distracted
2
sub3ects less able to counterargue. The X analyses of the
three types of counterarguments yielded mixed results. While
analysis of Brock counterarguments resulted in weak effects
of both distraction and discrepancy at the .10 level of
significance, analysis of message rejection counterarguments
22
resulted in no significant effects. However, the analysis of
source rejection counterarguments yielded a significant main
effect of distraction.
In addition to the preceding, two other measures yielded
interesting effects. The first, a measure of the reinforcing
value of a humorous film distraction, indicated that the
distraction was found to be aversive rather than reinforcing.
The second, a measure of source rejection, yielded a sig-
nificant interaction between distraction and discrepancy.
This interaction which was not predicted may be related to
the fact that the distracting presentation was found to be
more aversive than the non-distracting one. Possibly, subject
reactions to a highly discrepant communication coupled with
a presentation found to be aversive combined to yield an
especially strong source rejection response for distracted
subjects at the high discrepancy level. Inspection of the
data indicates that this interpretation is at least plausible.
The implications of the source rejection measure for the
attitude data will be explored later in this section.
Unfortunately, the predicted discrepancy interaction
between distraction and discrepancy with distracted subjects
counterarguing less and non-distracted subjects counter arguing
more as discrepancy increased failed to materialize. However,
it should be noted that Brock counterarguments yielded a
weak effect of discrepancy (.10 level of significance) which
lends some support to Brock's (1967) findings that counter-
arguing increases with discrepancy. The overall failure of
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discrepancy to yield significant results could be attributed
to a general failure of the discrepancy manipulation.
However, the appropriate manipulation checks indicated that
this interpretation is unlikely since subjects did perceive
the intended differences in the various discrepancy
recommendations. Since subjects were informed of both the
general recommendation of the communication as well as the
discrepancy recommendation specific to an experimental con-
dition, it could be argued that the subjects rejected so
strongly the general recommendation that research time be
increased that the specific recommendation designed to
manipulate discrepancy had no impact on attitude. However,
this interpretation tends to be contradicted by the results
of the Dunnett's tests (comparing each experimental group's
attitude scores with those of the control group) which indicated
that the communication did have a significant impact on
subjects* attitudes.
The failure of the discrepancy manipulation to yield
significant effects becomes more understandable if one views
the message recommendation as an attack on a c/pe of cultural
truism (McGuire, 1964). In his development of inoculation
theory, McGuire defines a cultural truism as a widely held
belief which is rarely, if ever, attacked. However, when
attacked, cultural truisms are more susceptible to change
than are other beliefs because the subject lacks counter-
arguments in his cognitive files to refute the attack. Since
the teaching-research issue is a lively topic of controversy
24
on many university campuses, one might argue that subjects
would have readily available numerous counterarguments
concerning the issue. However, debate on the issue usually
centers around how much faculty members should increase
teaching time and decrease research time, which is the
opposite of the general recommendation. Since rarely is
anyone heard advocating an increase in research time while
decreasing teaching time, there is little reason for subjects
to have available refutational arguments to counter the
advocated position. Therefore, it is felt that the general,
message recommendation could onstitute an attack on a
cultural truism, for which subjects had few refutational
arguments to counter the message. The extremely low frequency
of coun terarguing in general and Brock counterarguments
specifically (see Table 3) is indicative of a lack of appro-
priate counterarguments in a subject's cognitive file. Thus,
without counterarguments in a subject's cognitive file, it
was impossible for the discrepancy manipulation to operate.
In order to determine whether discrepancy is simply not of
importance as an ellcitor of counterarguments in the
distraction situation or whether discrepancy failed to
operate in the predicted manner due to the issue employed,
further research should be conducted. In order to examine
this explanation, future research should use a larger sample
of subjects as well as empl oying a counteratt itudinnl issue
for which a subject's exposure to counterarguments is
experimentally manipulated.
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The failure of the attitude measure to yield significant
effects is puzzling. It is possible that some or all of the
four proposed mediators (combined comprehension, total counter-
argument production, source rejection, and the reinforcement
value of distraction) of the effects of distraction upon
attitude change combined psychologically in such a manner
as to cancel one another's effects on attitudes. In order to
investigate the effects of these potential mediators of
attitude change, certain correlational data were computed.
However, in an after-only experimental design such as the
present study, correlations involving attitudes need to be
interpreted with reservation since they may, in part, reflect
how an initial position on a given issue correlates with
another variable rather than how attitude change relates to
the other variable. This interpretation is inconsistent,
however, with the fact that the variance of the attitude
scores in the control group was very small (X = 6.26, SD = .97)
and significantly different from the experimental groups
(X = 3.98, SD = 1.69) by an F test (F = 3.04, df = 113/17,
p .01). Therefor individual differences in attitude
scores in the experimental groups primarily represent attitude
change.
It should be remembered that Haaland and Vankatesan
(1968) proposed that comprehension mediates the distraction
effects resulting in reduced attitude change for distracted
subjects. While the results of the present study confirmed
that distracted subjects comprehended less, the correlations
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between attitude scores and combined comprehension yielded
no significant relationships between these two variables.
Therefore, the assumption that comprehension mediates attitude
change appears to be unwarranted at least in this study.
It is also possible to argue that the predicted effects of
distraction upon attitude change are mediated by the reinforcing
value of the humorous film distraction. For example, since
the film is enjoyable and humorous, it could put the subject
in a pleasant frame of mind which could in turn make him more
receptive to a counterat ti tudinal communication. In this
study, a measure of the reinforcing value of distraction
indicated that the distraction presentation was more aversive
than the no distraction presentation. However, correlations
between this variable and attitude scores were not significant.
Thus, it would appear that in this study the reinforcement
value of the distraction is not an important mediator of attitudes.
Festinger and Maccoby (j.964) claimed that the correlations
between attitude s.:ores and source rejection provided
indirect evidence that counter arguing mediated the effect
of distraction on attitudes. However, the correlations
between attitude scores and source rejection in the present
study were not significant for either the distraction or the
no distraction conditions. (Nevertheless, there was a
significant correlation between attitude and source rejection
data pooled over all subjects.) Direct evidence that
distracted subjects were less able to counterargue the
communication was found in the analysis of variance for
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total counterarguing. Moreover, both Brock and source rejection
counterarguments yielded X 2 effects of distraction although
the former measure only reached the .10 level of significance.
In addition, correlations between attitude scores and total
counterarguing resulted in highly significant and consistent
relationships. The more one counterargued the message, the
less likely he was to accept it.
Since both source rejection and total counterargument
production resulted in significant correlations with attitude
scores, these mediators should be examined carefully in order
to determine if they could have canceled one another's effects
on attitude. Such a cancellation could have resulted in
non-significant attitude effects even though distraction had
a significant effect on some mediators. It should be remembered
that source rejection yielded a significant interaction between
distraction and discrepancy. Although the interaction
between distraction and discrepancy for total counterarguing
failed to reach significance, the pattern of cell means was
similar to that obtained for source rejection in that the
largest differences occurred at the high disciepancy level.
In other words, the distracted subjects rejected the source
more than the non-distracted subjects at the high discrepancy
level while they also counterargued less. According to the
correlational data, there is at least weak evidence that
increased source rejection inhibits attitude change and
there is stronger evidence that increased counterarguing
enhances attitude change. Since the impact of these two
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mediators is greatest at the high discrepancy level, it is
conceivable that source rejection and total counterarguing
canceled each other's effects upon attitude change resulting
in the non-significant effects of the independent variables
upon attitude change.
In conclusion, it is felt that while no effects of
distraction upon attitude change were
. obtained, valuable
insights into the operation of certain mediators were gathered
from the correlational data. Comprehension was found to have
little effect upon attitude change while counterarguing
yielded a strong relation to attitude change. Distraction
was found to be aversive and source rejection had a weak
relation to atti tude change . Further research can do much
to specify the precise roles of these mediators in attitude
change studies. Specifically, it was suggested that one
approach to specifying the role of discrepancy in eliciting
counterarguing is to experimentally vary the subject's
exposure to message counterargumen ts . Other approa ches to
the study of the mediators of attitude change are left to
the individual exod imenter.
4
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TABLE 1
Mean Posttest Attitude Scores
Low Moderate High
Discrepancy Discrepancy Discrepancy
No Distraction 3.84 4.00 3.63
Distraction 4.21
j
4.05 4.15
Note: The lower the score, the more the attitude change.
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TABLE 2
Mean Combined Comprehension Scores
Low Moderate High
Discrepancy Discrepancy Discrepancy
No Distraction 7.63 7.58 8. 32
Distraction 6.68 6. 74 6.47
Note: The higher the score, the more the comprehension.
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TABLE 4
Mean Source Rejection Scores
Low Moderate High
Discrepancy Discrepancy Discrepancy
No Distraction 8.95 8.84 7. 26
Distraction 8.53 7. 68 9.63
Note: The higher the score, the more the source rejection.
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TABLE 5
Summary of Correlations between Attitude Scores
and Potential Mediators of Attitude Change 1
No
Distraction
Distraction All Subjects
Combined
Comprehension .24 (55) -.04 (55) .06 (112)
Total
Counterarguments .36** (55) .49** (55) .39** (112)
Source
Re j ection .19 (55) .24 (55) .22* (112)
Reinforcement Value
of Distraction .05 (55) .24 (55) .14 (112)
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate df .
* p < .05
** p < .01
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